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Abstract 
Relations among indices of maternal mind-mindedness (appropriate and non-attuned 
mind-related comments) and children’s (a) internal state vocabulary and perspectival 
symbolic play at 26 months (N=206), and (b) theory of mind (ToM) at 51 months 
(n=161) were investigated. Appropriate comments were positively associated with ToM, 
but were unrelated to internal state language and perspectival symbolic play. Non-attuned 
comments were negatively correlated with internal state language and perspectival 
symbolic play, but were unrelated to ToM. Path analyses indicated that the best fit model 
assumed (a) indirect links between non-attuned comments and ToM via children’s 
perspectival symbolic play; (b) a direct link between appropriate comments and ToM, 
and (c) an indirect link between appropriate comments and ToM via children’s 
concurrent receptive verbal ability.  
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Mind-Mindedness and Theory of Mind: Mediating Roles of Language and Perspectival 
Symbolic Play 
There is now an established literature on social- and interpersonal-related 
individual differences in children’s understanding of mind. In the two decades since 
Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, and Youngblade (1991) first highlighted how 
children’s family-based exposure to internal state talk relates to their later theory of mind 
(ToM) performance, studies have continued to investigate relations between caregivers’ 
use of internal state language and children’s understanding of mind (e.g., Ruffman, Slade, 
& Crowe, 2002; Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007; Symons, Peterson, Slaughter, 
Roche, & Doyle, 2005). Research suggests that mothers’ tendency to engage in internal 
state talk is not driven solely by the child’s own interest in or competence with mental 
phenomena. For example, the facilitative effect of mothers’ internal state talk on 
children’s ToM performance is maintained when children’s own earlier language and 
ToM abilities are controlled for; moreover, children’s earlier ToM performance has been 
found to be unrelated to mothers’ later use of internal state talk (Ruffman et al., 2002). 
Some studies suggest that mothers’ use of a broad range of internal state talk is 
positively associated with children’s later ToM performance (Dunn et al., 1991; Ruffman 
et al., 2002). In contrast, others highlight relations between specific types of internal state 
talk and ToM. For example, in two small-scale studies, Slaughter et al. (2007) reported 
that children’s ToM performance was unrelated to mothers’ simple descriptions of 
characters’ cognitive states and emotions during a book reading task. Only mothers’ 
explicit references to characters’ thoughts and beliefs were positively associated with 
ToM performance. Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006, 2008) reported associations 
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between specific types of maternal internal state talk and children’s emotion 
understanding. Mothers’ desire-state talk at 15 months was positively associated with 
children’s emotion understanding at 24 months, whereas it was mothers’ think–know talk 
specifically in relation to their 24-month-olds’ own cognitive states that predicted 
emotion understanding at 33 months. These findings make sense in light of the fact that 
infants acquire desire-related words before they talk about thoughts and knowledge 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995), and given the plausible assumption that internal state talk is 
more effective in promoting an understanding of mind when it is matched to those 
internal states of which the infant is already aware.  
Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2006, 2008) assessed children’s emotion 
understanding (specifically, their ability to match emotional expressions appropriately to 
either emotional situations or people’s bodily orientations), rather than their performance 
on classic ToM tasks involving belief states. No conclusions can thus be drawn on 
whether mothers’ use of particular mental state terms at specific points in the child’s 
development has a similar facilitatory effect on children’s understanding of belief states. 
Moreover, Taumoepeau and Ruffman assessed mothers’ use of internal state language in 
the context of a picture-describing task, in which over half of the images depicted people 
expressing emotions, and Slaughter et al.’s (2007) measures of internal state talk were 
obtained from mothers’ narrative accounts of a story involving deception. Thus, the 
explicit emotional or false belief content of these tasks may have inflated mothers’ use of 
internal state language. Indeed, of the studies mentioned above on relations between 
caregiver internal state talk and children’s understanding of mind, only Dunn et al. (1991) 
5 
Mind-mindedness and ToM 
assessed caregivers’ use of internal state language during everyday, non-goal-oriented 
interactions. 
Meins and colleagues have approached the relation between internal state talk and 
ToM somewhat differently, focusing on the construct of maternal mind-mindedness. 
Mind-mindedness is defined as caregivers’ proclivity to treat their young children as 
individuals with minds of their own, and has been operationalized in terms of caregivers’ 
tendency (a) to describe their pre-schoolers with reference to mentalistic characteristics 
(Meins et al., 1998), (b) to attribute meaning to infants’ early non-word utterances 
(Meins, 1998), or (c) to comment appropriately on their infants’ putative internal states 
during play interactions in the first year of life (Meins, Fernyhough, Fradley, & Tuckey, 
2001).  
Unlike studies that have addressed how mothers’ general use of internal state 
language pertaining to any individual or event relates to children’s understanding of 
mind, research on mind-mindedness has investigated how mothers’ representations 
specifically of their children’s internal states predict later ToM abilities. Both the 
preschool and infancy operationalizations of mind-mindedness have been found to relate 
to superior ToM performance. Meins et al. (1998) reported positive associations between 
mothers’ tendency to describe their 3-year-olds in mentalistic terms and children’s 
performance on ToM tasks at age 4. Positive associations have also been found between 
mothers’ mind-mindedness during infant–mother interaction in the first year of life and 
children’s ToM performance between 4 and 5 years (Meins et al., 2002, 2003).  
There is thus compelling evidence that caregivers’ use of internal state talk while 
interacting with their young children facilitates children’s subsequent understanding of 
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mind. What is much less clear is precisely how caregivers’ internal state talk achieves its 
observed facilitatory effect. The first aim of the study reported here was to investigate 
whether children’s early representational abilities could help to explain any causal 
relation between maternal mind-mindedness in the first year of life and children’s ToM 
performance. Meins et al. (2003) proposed that early mind-mindedness may facilitate the 
development of children’s mentalizing abilities because, in accurately reading their 
infants’ internal states, mothers provide children with a linguistic scaffold for acquiring 
an understanding of internal states and how they can be expressed through language. If 
this argument is correct, mind-mindedness should relate to children’s acquisition of 
internal state language as well as to their ToM performance.  
Meins et al.’s (2003) study did not include any assessment of children’s early 
language, so previous research has not tested this hypothesis. However, there is evidence 
for a link between children’s own internal state language and their ToM performance. 
Symons et al. (2005) reported positive concurrent associations between children’s 
internal state discourse and ToM, and Ruffman et al. (2002) found that children’s earlier 
use of internal state talk predicted their later performance on a battery of tasks assessing 
false belief and emotion understanding. Ruffman et al. used regression analyses to 
explore longitudinal predictors of children’s ToM performance, but specific mediation 
models were not formally tested, precluding firm conclusions about precise 
developmental pathways linking mothers’ internal state language, children’s internal state 
language, and children’s ToM. Of note, however, is the fact that Ruffman et al.’s findings 
highlight a facilitatory effect only for children’s early use (at mean age 3) of internal state 
talk: a later assessment of internal state talk was unrelated to children’s subsequent 
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understanding of mind. This suggests that precocity in acquiring internal state vocabulary 
may reflect children’s corresponding precocity in acquisition of a representational ToM. 
An alternative possibility is that mind-minded interactions predict children’s later 
ToM abilities by facilitating children’s early understanding of perspectival difference, 
rather than their acquisition of internal state language. Fernyhough (2008) has proposed 
that mind-mindedness has its effects on children’s developing social cognition not 
through influencing the acquisition of mental-state concepts, but by presenting children 
with alternative appropriate perspectives on reality in such a way that they can be readily 
assimilated. This argument draws on evidence that exposure to perspective-shifting 
discourse contributes to improvements in ToM reasoning (e.g., Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 
2003; Harris, 2005; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003), and with findings that exposure to 
explicit metacognitive language is less important as a driving force in ToM development 
than situations in which children are specifically required to think about alternative 
perspectives (Peskin & Astington, 2004). On this view, caregivers’ attunement to their 
infants’ thoughts and feelings may help to foster children’s understanding that different 
people hold different perspectives on the world. In support of this suggestion, Laranjo, 
Bernier, Meins, and Carlson (2010) reported that mothers’ tendency to comment 
appropriately on their infants’ internal states at age 12 months was positively associated 
with children’s later (24 months) understanding that another person’s preference could be 
at odds with their own.  
Symbolic play is another context in which children’s understanding of 
perspectival difference has been assessed. In order to engage in pretense, children need to 
understand that an aspect of reality can be ‘taken’ in different ways; from different 
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perspectives on the play scenario, a given object could represent any number of things 
(Hobson, 1993). Perspectives may differ between individuals, but individuals are also 
free to change their own perspectives during object-based pretense: the child may begin 
by using the pencil as a toothbrush, but then swap to using it as a comb. This change in 
object representation can be instigated independently by the child or in response to a 
comment from a playmate. For example, the play tasks used by Lewis and Boucher 
(1988) and Meins and Russell (1997) required children to act on an experimenter’s 
suggestion as to how a junk object could be used within a symbolic play scenario (e.g., 
treating a plastic lunch box as a bath for a doll). Children were only given credit if they 
incorporated the experimenter’s suggestion into their play, and thus the task did not 
assess children’s underlying competence in symbolic play.  
Meins et al. (1998) reported that children’s ability to incorporate an 
experimenter’s perspective into their symbolic play was positively associated with 
mothers’ proclivity to describe their children with reference to their mental 
characteristics. In addition, collaborative symbolic play (and not solo symbolic play) has 
been identified as a predictor of children’s ToM performance (Astington & Jenkins, 
1995; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), suggesting that children’s willingness or ability to 
incorporate others’ perspectives in the context of symbolic play may be one pathway via 
which children’s social interactions relate to their later ToM performance.  
There are thus a number of alternative possible pathways linking early maternal 
mind-mindedness and children’s understanding of mind. Children’s nascent internal state 
concepts (reflected in their internal state language) or their understanding of perspectival 
difference (reflected in their perspectival symbolic play) could be associated with mind-
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mindedness and potentially mediate the relation between mind-mindedness and ToM. 
Alternatively, both internal state language and perspectival symbolic play could act as 
mediating variables. Moreover, it is possible that different aspects of mind-mindedness 
might be differentially associated with children’s internal state language, perspectival 
symbolic play, and ToM.  
The interaction-based assessment of mind-mindedness in the first year of life 
allows for a fine-grained investigation of how mothers’ references to their infants’ 
internal states during on-line interaction might facilitate children’s understanding of 
mind. The mind-mindedness coding scheme distinguishes between comments that are 
appropriate interpretations of the infant’s putative thoughts or feelings (appropriate mind-
related comments), and those that appear to misrepresent the infant’s likely internal state 
(non-attuned mind-related comments). Previous research has shown that mothers’ scores 
for appropriate and non-attuned mind-related comments are unrelated (Meins et al., 
2002), and appropriate comments occur five times more frequently than do non-attuned 
comments (Meins et al., 2003). Recent research also shows that the two mind-
mindedness indices are associated with different aspects of obstetric history; appropriate 
comments were associated with planned conception and perception of the pregnancy as 
being easy, whereas non-attuned comments were related to mothers’ feelings 
immediately after birth (Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & Turner, 2011). 
Moreover, appropriate and non-attuned mind-related comments have been found to make 
independent contributions in predicting attachment security, with high versus low scores 
on the two mind-mindedness indices distinguishing between mothers of infants in the 
different insecure categories (Meins et al., 2012).  
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These findings suggest that early mind-mindedness is not a unidimensional 
construct, raising the possibility that each type of comment might make independent 
contributions to children’s later understanding of mental phenomena. Supporting this 
view, Meins et al. (2002) reported that mothers’ appropriate mind-related comments at 
age 6 months were positively correlated with children’s ToM performance, accounting 
for 11% of the variance in ToM scores. In contrast, mothers’ mind-related comments that 
were not attuned to their 6-month-olds’ internal states did not predict children’s later 
ToM performance.  
In investigating predictive links between mind-mindedness and children’s later 
internal state language, perspectival symbolic play, and ToM, the study reported here 
sought (a) to address an important question about the developmental pathways through 
which mind-mindedness relates to later ToM; and (b) to establish whether the same 
developmental relations were observed for both indices of mind-mindedness. Although 
null findings for the relation between non-attuned mind-related comments and children’s 
later ToM were reported by Meins et al. (2002, 2003), this does not preclude the 
possibility that such comments may relate to children’s early grasp of internal state 
language or perspectival symbolic play. For example, if Meins et al. (2003) are correct to 
argue that early mind-minded discourse acts as a linguistic scaffold for children’s 
mentalizing abilities, having a mother who tends to misrepresent her infant’s internal 
states might have a detrimental impact on the child’s early acquisition of internal state 
language. Indeed, one could argue that such mislabelling of the infants’ cognitive and 
affective states will impact more strongly on infants’ acquisition of internal state 
language than will mothers’ appropriate mind-related comments. Finally, it was 
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important to establish that any observed relations were specific to mothers’ mind-
mindedness in the first year of life rather than their more general responsive caregiving. 
To establish the specificity of this association, the study reported here accordingly 
included a measure of maternal sensitivity (Ainsworth, Bell, & Stayton, 1971, 1974).  
 In summary, the present study investigated whether both indices of early maternal 
mind-mindedness—appropriate and non-attuned mind-related comments—related to 
children’s internal state language and perspectival symbolic play at age 2, and their ToM 
performance at age 4. We also explored whether children’s early language or symbolic 
play mediated the relation between early mind-mindedness and children’s ToM 
performance.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 206 mothers and children (108 girls), who were recruited 
through local health care professionals and mother-and-baby groups. The vast majority of 
the mothers (203) were White. The Hollingshead Index (Hollingshead, 1975) showed that 
participants came from wide-ranging socioeconomic status (SES) backgrounds, with 
around half of the sample (n=90) falling into the lowest two Hollingshead categories (no 
post-16 education, unemployed, unskilled–menial, or semi-skilled–manual occupation). 
At the beginning of the study, maternal age was M=28.08 years, SD=5.48, range 16–41, 
and 86 (41.7%) infants were first-born. 
At Phase 1, children were 8 months old (M=8.52, SD=0.48, range 7.0–10.2), at 
Phase 2 children were age 26 months (M=26.04, SD=0.86, range 24.1–28.9), and were 
age 51 months (M=51.53, SD=0.85, range 49.00–53.00) at Phase 3. All 206 infants 
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participated in the Phase 1 and 2 testing sessions, and 161 were followed up at age 51 
months. Attrition was due to families either moving away from the area or being unable 
to schedule convenient testing times. Compared with the families who were retained 
throughout the study, those who failed to complete the Phase 3 testing did not differ with 
respect to the mind-mindedness, age-2 language, and symbolic play variables, ts < 1.80, 
ds < 0.31. However, families who dropped out of the study had lower SES scores than 
those who completed all three phases, t(204) = 3.98, p < .001, d = 0.70. Nevertheless, the 
Phase 3 sample remained socially diverse, with 39% of families falling into the low SES 
group.  
Overview of Testing Procedures 
 All of the testing phases were conducted in the University’s developmental 
laboratories. At Phase 1, maternal mind-mindedness and maternal sensitivity were 
assessed from a free-play infant–mother interaction. Children’s internal state language 
and perspectival symbolic play were assessed at Phase 2. At the final testing phase, 
children completed a battery of ToM tasks and their receptive verbal ability was assessed. 
Phase 1: Maternal Mind-Mindedness  
 The mind-mindedness assessment formed part of a battery of measures in a 
testing session that lasted approximately 1 hour. Mothers and their infants were filmed in 
a 20-minute free play session, with the only instruction to mothers being to play with 
their infants as they would do if they had a few spare minutes together at home. A range 
of age-appropriate toys was available, and mothers were free to move around the room, 
although every session began with the mother and child together on a play mat in the 
center of the room. Mind-mindedness was coded using the procedures outlined by Meins 
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et al. (2001). Mothers’ speech during the sessions was transcribed verbatim, and all 
comments which included an internal state term referring to the infant’s mind or emotion 
(mind-related comments) were identified from the transcripts. Mind-related comments 
included references to wishes and desires, mental states (e.g., thoughts, knowledge, 
interests), mental processes (e.g., recognition, remembering, decision-making), emotions, 
and attempts to manipulate people’s beliefs (e.g., joking, teasing). Comments where the 
mother “put words into her infant’s mouth” so that her speech took the form of a dialogue 
were also classified as mind-related.  
 Each mind-related comment was then classed as appropriate or non-attuned by a 
researcher who was blind to all other measures. Appropriateness was assessed by 
watching the filmed interaction and using the verbatim transcript to identify all mind-
related comments. A comment was classified as an appropriate mind-related comment if 
any of the following criteria were met: (a) the independent coder believed the mother’s 
reading of her infant’s mind to be accurate; (b) it linked the infant’s current activity with 
related past or future events; or (c) it was a suggestion for a new activity after a lull in the 
interaction (e.g., “You’ll like this new toy”). A comment was coded as non-attuned if: (a) 
the coder disagreed with the mother’s reading of her infant’s mind; (b) the comment 
referred to a past or future event that had no obvious relation to the infant’s current 
activity; (c) the mother asked what the infant wanted to do, or commented that the infant 
wanted or preferred a different object or activity, when the infant was already actively 
engaged in an activity or was showing a clear preference for a particular object; or (d) the 
referent of the mother’s comment was not clear. A second researcher, blind to all other 
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measures and to the hypotheses of the study, coded a randomly selected 25% of the 
mother–infant interactions. Inter-rater agreement was  = .70 (87% agreement).  
 In order to control for differences in maternal verbosity, scores for appropriate 
mind-related comments and non-attuned mind-related comments were calculated as a 
proportion of the mother’s total number of comments made during the 20-minute session.  
Phase 1: Maternal Sensitivity 
Mothers’ behavior during the free-play session was also assessed for maternal 
sensitivity. A trained researcher who was blind to all other measures and to the study’s 
hypotheses scored sensitivity using Ainsworth et al.’s (1974) measure, which rates 
general sensitivity and responsiveness on a 1–9 point scale, with five anchor points 
between ‘highly sensitive’ (9) and ‘highly insensitive’ (1). A second trained, blind 
researcher coded a randomly selected 25% of the sessions. (Note that these researchers 
were not involved in coding mind-mindedness.) Inter-rater reliability (intra-class 
correlation) was .83. 
Phase 2: Infant Language 
Mothers completed the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory 
(MCI; Fenson et al., 1993). Mothers are required to report on children’s acquisition of 14 
words relating to internal states. The MCI also assesses mothers’ reports of their 
children’s general expressive language development. Children received a frequency score 
for the number of internal state words they were reported to use, and for their non-
internal state vocabulary.  
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Phase 2: Perspectival Symbolic Play 
Children’s perspectival symbolic play was assessed using two tasks: the Test of 
Pretend Play (ToPP; Lewis & Boucher, 1997) and a structured task involving junk 
objects (Lewis & Boucher, 1988; Meins & Russell, 1997). The ToPP is a standardized 
assessment of children’s symbolic play valid for use with children from 1 to 6 years. Two 
items from the ToPP were selected to assess absent object use (teddy has a drink) and 
property substitution (teddy is a bird). For each item children were provided with the 
necessary prop (in both cases a teddy bear) and allowed to engage in spontaneous 
symbolic play. The experimenter then asked the child to demonstrate a certain action with 
the prop (show me how teddy has a drink or show me how teddy can be a bird). The 
experimenter then modelled the action with the prop and encouraged the child to copy.  
For the absent object item, the child received credit (a score of 1) if they 
demonstrated teddy taking a drink from an imaginary cup. For the property substitution 
item, children received credit (a score of 1) if they demonstrated teddy pretending to fly. 
Children could receive further credit (a score of 1) if they showed another example of 
either absent object use or property substitution at any time. Children received a total 
frequency score for the number of symbolic acts performed during the task.  
The second play task involved junk objects (e.g., cardboard box, piece of 
aluminum foil) and two representational toys (a doll and a car) and was based on 
procedures used by Lewis and Boucher (1988) and Meins and Russell (1997). Children 
were given one of the toys paired with one of the junk objects and the experimenter asked 
the child, “What can you do with these?” (elicited play condition). If the child began to 
engage in a sequence of play, the experimenter asked him or her to explain what was 
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happening. When the sequence of play ended, or if the child did not engage in any play, 
the experimenter asked for a specific play sequence to be enacted (instructed condition). 
For example, for the car–cardboard box pair, the experimenter said, “Can you show me 
how the car drives into the garage?” The experimenter did not explicitly instruct the child 
to use the box as a garage; rather, she gave the child an open-ended suggestion of how the 
play materials might be construed (see Table 1).  
Children’s responses during the instructed play condition were scored using the 
criteria outlined in Table 1. All of the play sessions were scored by a researcher who was 
blind to all other measures and to the hypotheses of the study. Children received a score 
for the overall level of sophistication of play under the instructed condition, with 
potential scores ranging from 0 to 24. Scores in the instructed play condition indicated 
children’s tendency to incorporate the experimenter’s suggestion into their play and thus 
index their perspectival symbolic play. Inter-rater reliabilty (intra-class correlation) for 
the instructed condition was .78. 
Phase 3: Theory of Mind 
At 51 months, children completed a ToM battery based on Wellman and Liu 
(2004): (a) Diverse Beliefs task which assessed children’s ability to recognize a belief 
that differed from their own and to predict the protagonist’s behavior on the basis of this 
belief, (b) Knowledge Access task which assessed children’s understanding that 
knowledge depends on previous access to crucial information, (c) Contents False Belief – 
Other task which assessed children’s recognition that another person will predict the 
contents of a container on the basis of its outward appearance (potato chips) rather than 
its actual contents (a toy pig), (d) Contents False Belief – Self task which assessed 
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children’s recognition of their own initial false belief regarding the unexpected contents 
of a container, (e) Explicit False Belief task which assessed children’s ability to predict 
the protagonist’s search behavior on the basis of what they are told about where he or she 
thinks the object is rather than where the object really is, and (f) Unexpected Transfer 
task which assessed children’s ability to predict the protagonist’s behavior on the basis of 
his or her false belief. The gender of the story protagonists matched the child’s gender, 
and the order in which the tasks were presented was randomized and counterbalanced. 
Memory and reality control questions were used, and all control questions had to be 
passed in addition to the test question for the child to be credited with passing the 
individual task. Ten percent of children failed a control question across the six tasks. For 
each task that was passed, the child received 1 point, resulting in total possible scores 
ranging between 0 and 6. 
Receptive Verbal Ability  
Children’s receptive verbal ability was assessed using the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale II (BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997) at 51 months. 
Standardized BPVS scores were used in the analyses. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses  
 Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 2. Mind-mindedness and 
sensitivity data were not available for one participant due to a technical problem during 
Phase 1 recording. MCI data were available for 190 children; missing data were due to 
mothers failing to complete the MCI. Symbolic play data were available for 197 children; 
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nine children failed to complete the play assessments due to attention difficulties. 
Complete datasets across the three testing ages were available for 150 children. 
 Scores for non-attuned mind-related comments, internal state language, and ToPP 
were all positively skewed, and transformation did not improve the normality of their 
distributions. Non-parametric correlations yielded the same results as parametric 
correlations, and thus parametric correlations are reported for ease of interpreting effect 
sizes.  
Scores on the ToPP and instructed condition of junk object play task were 
robustly positively correlated, r(194) = 0.43, p < .001. Scores on these two symbolic play 
measures were thus totalled to give a composite perspectival symbolic play score. Scores 
for this composite measure were normally distributed. 
Cronbach’s  for the ToM battery was .63, Although  was somewhat lower than 
the level generally accepted as indicating good internal reliability (.70), Pedhazur and 
Schmelkin (1991) advised that lower levels of  were acceptable when complete 
homogeneity is not expected across individual measures. The internal reliability of the 
ToM battery is in line with those reported in studies that have used similar ToM measures 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Meins et al., 2002), in which internal reliabilities ranged 
between .50 and .80.  
SES was positively associated with (a) maternal sensitivity, r(203) = .30, p < 
.001, (b) appropriate mind-related comments, r(203) = .16, p < .05, (c) children’s 
perspectival symbolic play scores, r(195) = .35, p < .001, and (d) children’s ToM scores, 
r(161) = .20, p < .025. SES was unrelated to non-attuned mind-related comments, r(203) 
= -.05, n.s., and children’s internal state language, r(190) = .09, n.s. 
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 Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for all variables. With regard to relations 
among the variables assessing infant–mother interaction at 8 months, replicating previous 
findings (Meins et al., 2001, 2003), (a) appropriate and non-attuned mind-related 
comments were unrelated, (b) maternal sensitivity was positively correlated with 
appropriate mind-related comments, and (c) maternal sensitivity was unrelated to non-
attuned mind-related comments. (Note that these correlations were previously published 
in Meins et al. 2011, 2012.)  
Relations between Maternal Sensitivity and Child Variables 
 As shown in Table 3, maternal sensitivity was positively associated with 
children’s perspectival symbolic play scores, but was unrelated to internal state language 
and ToM scores. Once SES was controlled, maternal sensitivity was no longer related to 
children’s play (see Table 3). 
Relations between Appropriate Mind-Related Comments and Child Variables 
 As shown in Table 3, appropriate mind-related comments were unrelated to 
children’s internal state language and perspectival symbolic play scores at age 26 months, 
but were positively correlated with ToM performance at 51 months. Mothers’ tendency to 
comment appropriately on their infants’ thoughts and feelings at 8 months was associated 
with better performance on a battery of ToM tasks at 51 months. The partial correlations 
presented in Table 3 show that this pattern of findings was maintained when SES was 
controlled.  
 Due to the robust positive correlation between appropriate mind-related 
comments and maternal sensitivity, we further partialled out sensitivity to explore 
whether the relation between appropriate comments and ToM was independent of 
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mothers’ sensitivity. The correlation remained significant when both SES and sensitivity 
were controlled, r(157) = .22, p < .01. 
Relations between Non-Attuned Mind-Related Comments and Child Variables 
 As shown in Table 3, non-attuned mind-related comments were negatively 
correlated with children’s internal state language and their perspectival symbolic play 
scores at 26 months, but were unrelated to children’s ToM scores. The negative relation 
between non-attuned comments and play remained once SES was partialled out, but the 
relation between non-attuned comments and internal state language was reduced to a non-
significant trend (p = .094) when SES was controlled (see Table 3). When maternal 
sensitivity was added as an additional control variable, the same results were found (r = -
.26, p < .001, and r = -.12, p = .093, respectively). 
Pathways to Children’s Theory of Mind 
One aim of the present study was to investigate whether relations between the two 
indices of early mind-mindedness and children’s later ToM performance were mediated 
by children’s early internal state language and perspectival symbolic play. Path analyses 
were used to address this question. Path analysis requires that the variables used to test 
the model arise from a joint multivariate normal distribution, rather than requiring normal 
distribution of each individual variable. The normality of the multivariate distributions of 
the variables in the models reported below was assessed on the basis of joint multivariate 
kurtosis and skewness values. All were less than the critical value of 1.00, and thus joint 
multivariate normal distribution was assumed. However, given the non-normal 
distributions of two variables included in the path analyses (mothers’ non-attuned mind-
related comments, children’s internal state language), we adopted the conservative 
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approach of reporting the Bollen-Stine bootstrap p-value for the overall model fit. This 
bootstrapping approach is the preferred method for dealing with non-normality in path 
analyses (Bollen & Stine, 1993). The p-values reported below for model fit are thus 
calculated using the Bollen-Stine bootstrap method. 
The path analyses used maximum likelihood estimation. Four criteria were used 
to evaluate the fit of the different models: the 2 statistic, the adjusted goodness of fit 
index (AGFI), the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean error square of 
approximation (RMSEA). A model represents an adequate fit to the data if the following 
criteria are met: (a) a non-significant result for the 2 test; (b) AGFI value above .90; (c) 
CFI value above .95, and (d) RMSEA value below .08. 
Model 1 assumed full mediation, with no direct paths between either mind-
mindedness variable and children’s ToM. Due to the positive correlations shown in 
Tables 3 and 4, the following paths were also in Model 1: (a) internal state language to 
receptive verbal ability, (e) perspectival symbolic play to receptive verbal ability, and (f) 
receptive verbal ability scores to ToM. Model 1 was found to be a poor fit to the data, 
2(6) = 15.00, p = .020, AGFI = .93, CFI = .78, RMSEA = .10.  
Model 1 shows that the assumption that children’s internal state language and 
perspectival symbolic play mediate the relation between both indices of maternal mind-
mindedness and children’s ToM did not fit the observed data. The correlational analyses 
(see Tables 3 and 4) can be used to refine the mediational pathways outlined in the 
Introduction. The correlations suggest that mediation may be more likely for the relation 
between ToM and mothers’ non-attuned mind-related comments than for the link 
between ToM and appropriate mind-related comments. In contrast, appropriate mind-
22 
Mind-mindedness and ToM 
related comments were not correlated with internal state language or perspectival 
symbolic play. However, the correlational analyses showed a positive association 
between mothers’ appropriate mind-related comments and children’s receptive verbal 
ability at age 51 months. Thus, it is possible that children’s receptive verbal ability might 
mediate the relation between mothers’ appropriate mind-related comments and children’s 
ToM performance.  
These findings formed the basis of a second mediational model, Model 2, in 
which (a) internal state language and perspectival symbolic play mediated the relation 
between non-attuned mind-related comments and children’s ToM, and (b) receptive 
verbal ability mediated the relation between appropriate mind-related comments and 
ToM. This model was found to be a good fit to the data, 2(8) = 9.89, p = .273, AGFI = 
.96, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .04. Models 1 and 2 had different degrees of freedom, enabling 
comparisons between them to be made on the basis of change in 2. Although individual 
fit indices all showed that Model 2 was a better fit compared with Model 1, the change in 
2 between these two models was not significant, 2diff(2) = 5.11, n.s.  
Given the positive correlation between appropriate mind-related comments and 
ToM, we adapted Model 2 by adding a direct path between these variables to investigate 
whether this would improve the model. Model 3 (see Figure 1) was found to be an 
excellent fit to the data,2(6) = 4.63, p = .642, AGFI = .98, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00. 
Significant pathways are shown in Model 3. Comparing the models on the basis of 
change in 2, Model 3 was found to be an improvement on Model 1, 2diff(1) = 10.37, p 
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< .005, and Model 2, 2diff(1) = 5.26, p < .05. Individual fit indices were also higher for 
Model 3 than for either of the other models.  
There were two non-significant pathways in Model 3: (a) between non-attuned 
mind-related comments and internal state language, and (b) between perspectival 
symbolic play and ToM. The path analyses were re-run removing each of these pathways 
in turn. Removing the path between non-attuned mind-related comments and internal 
state language resulted in a non-significant increase in 2, showing that the inclusion of 
this path did not result in improving the fit of the model, 2diff(1) = 1.56, n.s. In contrast, 
removing the path between perspectival symbolic play and ToM resulted in a significant 
increase in 2 for the model, 2diff(1) = 6.21, p < .025, showing that removing this 
pathway resulted in a significantly worse fit to the data. Thus, in the remaining analyses, 
the pathway between non-attuned mind-related comments and internal state language was 
removed from the model, but that between perspectival symbolic play and ToM was 
retained, resulting in Model 4 (see Figure 2), 2(7) = 6.19, p = .587, AGFI = .97, CFI = 
1.00, RMSEA = .00. 
Next, we investigated whether the relation between appropriate mind-related 
comments and children’s ToM was purely direct. The pathway between appropriate 
mind-related comments and children’s receptive verbal ability (the mediated pathway) 
was removed from Model 4. The resulting Model 5 was a poor fit, 2(8) = 16.05, p = 
.042, AGFI = .95, CFI = .85, RMSEA = .07, suggesting that concurrent receptive verbal 
ability partially mediated the relation between appropriate mind-related comments and 
ToM.  
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Finally, given that relations with non-internal state language and the other 
variables were very similar to those for relations with internal state language (see Tables 
3 and 4), we replaced the internal state language variable in Model 4 with children’s non-
internal state language to test whether the observed pathways were specific to children’s 
early acquisition of internal state language. The resulting Model 6 was also a good fit to 
the data, 2(7) = 7.76, p = .354, AGFI = .97, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .03. (Note that change 
in 2 between Model 4 and Model 6 could not be calculated because both have the same 
degrees of freedom.) This suggests that the observed developmental pathways between 
early language and later ToM hold for overall productive language, not only for 
acquisition of internal state language. 
Discussion 
 The results of the study reported here extend previous research on links between 
mind-mindedness and children’s social-cognitive development in a number of ways. Our 
findings suggest that the two indices of early mind-mindedness—appropriate and non-
attuned mind-related comments—relate to different social-cognitive developmental 
outcomes in the child. Mothers’ tendency to comment appropriately on their 8-month-
olds’ putative internal states was directly associated with children’s ToM performance at 
age 4, but unrelated to children’s acquisition of internal state language and their 
perspectival symbolic play at age 2. In contrast, mothers’ non-attuned mind-related 
comments at age 8 months were negatively associated with internal state language and 
perspectival symbolic play, but unrelated to ToM. Higher scores for mothers’ non-
attuned mind-related comments at age 8 months were associated with smaller internal 
state vocabularies and lower levels of perspectival symbolic play at age 26 months. 
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However, the path analyses showed that the best fit model included a direct link only 
between non-attuned comments and perspectival symbolic play, and not between non-
attuned comments and internal state language. These findings further highlight the 
multidimensional nature of the mind-mindedness construct.  
 Our main goal was to shed light on the potential mechanisms via which mothers’ 
mind-mindedness in the first year of life might relate to children’s understanding of mind 
in the preschool years. As discussed in the Introduction, Meins et al. (2003) suggested 
that appropriate mind-related comments might provide a linguistic scaffold for children’s 
comprehension of internal states, which could in turn lead to the prediction that children’s 
own acquisition of internal state language would mediate the relation between 
appropriate mind-related comments and ToM performance. We found no evidence to 
support this prediction. Moreover, replacing internal state language with a measure of 
children’s non-internal state language in the final path analysis also resulted in a good fit 
to the data, suggesting that children’s early language production in general, rather than 
their specific acquisition of internal state terms, predicts later ToM performance. This 
conclusion is in line with Ruffman et al.’s (2002) finding that children’s earlier general 
language ability was more strongly related to subsequent ToM (rs between .57 and .60) 
than was their earlier mental state language (rs between .09 and .45). 
 We also considered whether a second variable—children’s understanding of 
perspectival difference as reflected in their symbolic play—mediated the relation between 
maternal mind-mindedness and children’s ToM. Mothers’ non-attuned mind-related 
comments were negatively related to children’s perspectival symbolic play, with 
perspectival symbolic play going on to predict later ToM performance. In contrast, 
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mothers’ appropriate mind-related comments were not associated with children’s 
perspectival symbolic play at age 2. Our findings thus support the notion that children’s 
early perspectival symbolic play mediates the relation between maternal mind-
mindedness and children’s ToM performance. However, this relation appears to hold 
only for non-attuned mind-related comments, and not for appropriate mind-related 
comments.  
The different developmental trajectories of appropriate versus non-attuned mind-
related comments may help explain the somewhat complex findings in the extant 
literature with regard to the relation between mothers’ internal state talk and children’s 
ToM. For example, while some studies have found evidence for a positive association 
between ToM and mothers’ general use of internal state talk (e.g., Dunn et al., 1991), 
others have reported facilitatory effects only for certain specific aspects of internal state 
talk (e.g., Slaughter et al., 2007). The present findings suggest that the actual content of 
internal state talk may not be the crucial factor; rather, ToM might be associated with 
mothers’ tendency to tailor their internal-state talk to their children’s current level of 
cognitive or emotional engagement with the world.  
If children’s internal state language and perspectival symbolic play cannot help to 
clarify the mechanisms via which appropriate (as opposed to non-attuned) mind-related 
comments facilitate children’s later understanding of mind, how else might we account 
for the observed relation? The path analyses highlighted a potential mediating role for a 
variable that was not considered initially: children’s receptive verbal ability at age 4. The 
model best fitting the longitudinal data assumed that (a) there was a direct link between 
appropriate mind-related comments and children’s ToM, (b) the relation between non-
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attuned mind-related comments and ToM was indirect and functioned via children’s 
perspectival symbolic play, and (c) there was an additional indirect link between 
appropriate mind-related comments and ToM via children’s receptive verbal ability at 
age 4. Although the effect size for the positive relation between appropriate mind-related 
comments at 8 months and children’s receptive verbal ability at age 4 was modest (see 
Table 3), the path analyses showed that the best fit model included a mediating path from 
appropriate comments to ToM via receptive verbal ability.  
It is interesting to note that appropriate mind-related comments were related to 
later receptive verbal ability but not to children’s language abilities at age 2, despite the 
fact that the measures of children’s early language were robustly positively correlated 
with their receptive verbal ability at age 4. One potential explanation for these discrepant 
relations between appropriate mind-related comments and children’s early versus late 
language is the fact that language was assessed in terms of expressive abilities at age 2 
and receptive abilities at age 4. Successful performance on measures of receptive verbal 
ability arguably requires flexibility in comprehending the meaning of the items. For 
example, in standardized tests of receptive verbal ability such as the BPVS, the child has 
to choose which of four pictures best matches the word spoken by the experimenter. 
Several test items do not involve object labeling using nouns, focusing instead on 
adjectives (e.g., wooden) and verbs (e.g., dancing, wrapping, smelling) that require the 
child to process and contrast the pictures using different criteria to those involved in 
straightforward object labeling. In particular, appropriate attribution of adjectives 
arguably requires an understanding of the aspectuality of such labels: the fact that more 
than one such label can be appropriate at the same time (Meins & Fernyhough, 2007). 
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In further investigating this proposal, future research could address whether 
mothers’ appropriate mind-related comments are more strongly related to receptive 
verbal tasks which explicitly require perspective-taking than to those that also assess 
more basic object labeling. Children’s ToM performance is known to be positively 
associated with their understanding of synonyms and sub- versus super-ordinate 
categories (Doherty & Perner, 1998; Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002) and 
their recognition that two different adjectives might be equally correct descriptions of a 
particular object (Meins & Fernyhough, 2007). These findings suggest that children’s 
understanding of different perspectives in the context of ToM tasks generalizes to their 
ability to think flexibly about ways in which aspects of the world can be represented and 
described linguistically. It would thus be interesting to investigate relations between 
mothers’ early use of appropriate mind-related comments and children’s performance on 
such tasks in order to establish whether children’s understanding of aspectuality mediates 
the relation between mothers’ appropriate comments and children’s ToM performance.  
Children’s early executive functioning is also a potential candidate for mediating 
the relation between appropriate mind-related comments and children’s ToM. Executive 
function abilities have a protracted period of postnatal development (e.g., Gur et al., 
2012), and there is increasing recognition that the child’s early social environment is 
likely to impact on these abilities. Recent research suggests that mind-mindedness is one 
aspect of the social environment that predicts children’s executive functioning. For 
example, Bernier and colleagues (Bernier, Carlson, Deschênes, & Matte-Gagné, 2012; 
Bernier, Carlson, & Whipple, 2010) reported that mothers’ appropriate mind-related 
comments in infancy were positively associated with children’s subsequent performance 
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on executive function tasks. In addition, there is a well-established link between 
executive function and ToM abilities (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001). In Fernyhough’s 
(2008) model, executive functioning and ToM are linked because both involve dialogic 
thinking, defined as the ability to operate with the internalized, semiotically mediated 
perspectives of others, which is in turn fostered by interactions with mind-minded others. 
Future research should thus further explore whether assessment of children’s early 
executive function abilities can help to fill in the developmental picture concerning the 
observed link between mothers’ appropriate mind-related comments and children’s ToM.  
 As well as considering additional child-centered factors that may act as potential 
mediators of the relation between appropriate mind-related comments and children’s 
ToM, it is also important to explore whether other aspects of maternal interaction play a 
mediational role. Meins et al. (2003) found no evidence that a later measure of mind-
mindedness mediated the relation between appropriate mind-related comments in infancy 
and children’s ToM performance, but research has not yet investigated relations with 
other aspects of mothers’ interactional behavior. Mothers who tend to comment 
appropriately on their young infants’ internal states may be more likely to scaffold their 
children’s behavior in a psychologically attuned manner later in development. For 
example, Meins et al. (1998) reported a medium size positive correlation between 
mothers’ mental descriptions of their children and their concurrent sensitivity in tutoring 
their child during a challenging construction task (Meins, 1997). Sensitivity was defined 
in terms of the mother’s tendency to use feedback on her child’s performance to alter the 
level of specificity of her instructions and interventions. It seems reasonable to predict 
that mothers who tend to comment appropriately on their infants’ internal states during 
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the first year of life will be better able later in development to assess their children’s basic 
ability on tasks, collaborate with them in achieving goals, and structure interactions in 
such a way to enhance children’s sense of their own competence. Future research into the 
evolving dynamics of the mother–child relationship may thus help shed light on the 
mechanisms via which mothers’ appropriate attunement to their infants’ internal states 
predicts children’s later understanding of mind.  
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Table 1   
Scoring for Instructed Play Condition 
 
 Car with cardboard box ‘garage’ 0 pushes car along table 
 1 box held upside down on table, car placed  
  inside box 
 2 box on table, correct orientation, car placed  
  in box 
 3 box on table, correct orientation, car pushed  
  along table into box 
 4 as 3, but child closes flap in appropriate  
  orientation when car inside 
 
Car with cardboard inner tube ‘tunnel’ 0 pushes car along table 
1 pushes car over the tube, or some other 
interaction between the two objects 
 2 tube held upright, car dropped in 
 3 tube on table on its side, car pushed along  
  table into the tube 
 4 as 3, but ‘drives’ car out 
 
Car with cardboard ‘road’ and ‘bridge’ 0 plays with car or ‘road’ or ‘bridge’ 
 1 some interaction between car and road or car  
  and bridge 
 2 puts road and bridge together but no  
  interaction with car, or drives car underneath  
  bridge 
 3 drives car over bridge 
 4 drives car along road up to bridge and over  
  the top 
 
Doll with lunch box ‘bath’ 0 plays with doll 
 1 some interaction between doll and box 
 2 places box in correct orientation 
 3 places doll in box 
 4 prepares doll for bath and places her in box,  
  or splashing water on doll when in box 
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Doll with foil ‘mirror’ 0 plays with doll 
 1 some interaction between doll and foil 
 2 places doll on foil, face down 
 3 lets doll look at herself in the mirror but with  
  doll in non-attuned position (e.g., upside  
  down) 
4 shows how doll can look face to face in  
 mirror, doll in appropriate position 
 
Doll with muffin case ‘plate’ and 0 plays with doll or ‘table’ or ‘plate’ 
jar lid ‘table’ 1 some interaction between doll and table, or  
  doll and plate 
 2 puts plate on table but no involvement with  
  doll; or puts doll at table but no    
  involvement with plate; or some interaction  
  of all three objects 
 3 doll eats off plate 
 4 doll eats off plate while sitting at table 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables  
 Mean Range 
Maternal Variables  
Total number of comments 219.22 (69.65) 48–395 
Appropriate mind-related 11.94 (8.66) 0–42 
 Comments (total) 
Appropriate mind-related 5.34 (3.64) 0–19 
 Comments (percentage) 
Non-attuned mind-related 3.53 (4.56) 0–28 
 Comments (total) 
Non-attuned mind-related 1.59 (1.88) 0–9 
 Comments (percentage) 
Maternal sensitivity 5.64 (1.48) 2–9 
Child Variables 
MCI internal state language 4.73 (3.95) 0–14 
MCI non-internal state language 317.40 (160.90) 7–637 
Test of Pretend Play  3.05 (2.77) 0–17 
Instructed play 11.87 (5.12) 0–23 
Theory of mind 3.03 (1.75) 0–6 
Control variables 
Hollingshead Index 34.00 (14.03) 11–66 
 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix for All Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Appropriate MRC 
2. Non-attuned MRC .07 .11 
3. Sensitivity .39 .36 .04 .09 
4. Child ISL .11 .01 -.19
**
 -.14 .04 .07 
5. Child non-ISL .13 .02 -.10 -.10 .12 .04 .88 .87 
6. Perspectival symbolic play .10 .04 -.24 -.22 .21 .08 .13 .08 .19
** 
.14 
7. Theory of mind .24 .21
**
 -.11 -.10 .09 .04 .38 .36 .35 .32 .24 .17
*
 
8. Receptive verbal ability .18
*
 .19
*
 -.11 -.16 .23 .10 .28 .26 .31 .30 .33 .19
*
 .40 .38  
9. Hollingshead (SES) score .16
*
 -.05 .30 .09 .09 .35 .20
*
 .32
 
 
*
p < .05; 
**
p < .01; p < .005; p < .001. 
Note: MRC = mind-related comments; ISL = internal state language. Partial correlations (controlling for SES) are shown in bold.
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Model 3: Mediation via internal state language and perspectival symbolic play 
for the relation between non-attuned mind-related comments and theory of mind; direct 
and mediated (via receptive verbal ability) relations between appropriate mind-related 
comments and theory of mind  
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are shown on the individual pathways. 
*
p < .05; 
**
p < .01; p < .005; p < .001. 
Figure 2. Model 4: Mediation via perspectival symbolic play for the relation between 
non-attuned mind-related comments and theory of mind; direct and mediated (via 
receptive verbal ability) relations between appropriate mind-related comments and theory 
of mind  
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are shown on the individual pathways. 
*
p < .05; 
**
p < .01; p < .005; p < .001. 
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